Kronstadt Men's Carlo Waistcoat Jacket

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The Soviet forces suffered over 10,000 casualties storming Kronstadt. There are no reliable figures for the rebels loses or how many were later shot by the Cheka or sent to prison camps. The figures that exist are fragmentary. Immediately after the defeat of the revolt, 4,836 Kronstadt sailors were arrested and deported to the Crimea and the Caucasus. When Lenin heard of this on the 19th of April, he expressed great misgivings about it and they were finally sent to forced labour camps in the Archangelsk, Vologda and Murmansk regions. Eight thousand sailors, soldiers and civilians escaped over the ice to Finland. The crews of the Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol fought to the bitter end, as did the cadets of the mechanics school, the torpedo detachment and the communications unit. A statistical communiqué stated that 6,528 rebels had been arrested, of whom 2,168 had been shot (33%), 1,955 had been sentenced to forced labour (of whom 1,486 received a five year sentence), and 1,272 were released. A statistical review of the revolt made in 1935-6 listed the number arrested as 10,026 and stated that it had "not been possible to establish accurately the number of the repressed." The families of the rebels were deported, with Siberia considered as "undoubtedly the only suitable region" for them. Rogovin, Vadim Zakharovich (2009). Stalin's Terror of 1937-1938: Political Genocide in the USSR. Mehring Books. p.359. ISBN 978-1-893638-04-4. USED' indicates that the item is not new, and may have signs of use or damage. Significant issues will be detailed in the description. The New Cambridge Modern History. Vol.xii. CUP Archive. p.448. GGKEY:Q5W2KNWHCQB. Archived from the original on 2020-04-30 . Retrieved 2016-03-18.

Faced with the prospect of summary executions, about 8,000 Kronstadt refugees (mostly soldiers) [198] crossed into Finland within a day of Kronstadt's fall, about half of the rebel forces. Petrichenko and members of the Kronstadt Revolutionary Committee were among the first to flee, with 800 arriving before the end of the assault. [199] The sailors' final acts were to sabotage Kronstadt's defenses, removing parts of weapons and equipment. The battleship crews, upon discovering their leaders' desertion, disobeyed their command to destroy the ships and instead arrested their officers and surrendered to the Bolsheviks. [200] Aftermath [ edit ] Petrichenko and other Kronstadt rebels in Finnish exileLourie, Richard (2019). Sakharov: A Biography. Plunkett Lake Press. p.26. Archived from the original on 2021-01-19 . Retrieved 2021-01-07. Mawdsley, Evan (1973). "The Baltic Fleet and the Kronstadt Mutiny". Soviet Studies. 24 (4): 506–521. doi: 10.1080/09668137308410887. ISSN 0038-5859. JSTOR 150800.

The Baltic Fleet had been shrinking since the summer of 1917, when it had eight battleships, nine cruisers, more than fifty destroyers, about forty submarines, and hundreds of auxiliary vessels. In 1920, only two battleships, sixteen destroyers, six submarines, and a minesweeper fleet remained from the original fleet. [53] [54] Now unable to heat their ships, the sailors were further angered [54] by the fuel shortage [55] and there were fears that even more ships would be lost owing to flaws that made them especially vulnerable in winter. [56] Island supply was also poor, [55] partly due to the highly centralized control system. Many units had not yet received their new uniforms in 1919. [56] Rations decreased in quantity and quality, and towards the end of 1920 the fleet suffered an outbreak of scurvy. Protests demanding improvements in soldier food rations went ignored and agitators were arrested. [55]Some of the government troops sent to suppress the revolt, upon learning that the island's rule by commissioners had been eliminated, instead defected to the rebellion. [119] The government had serious problems with the regular troops sent to suppress the uprising, and resorted to using cadets and Cheka agents. [120] The high-ranking Bolshevik leaders responsible for the operation had to return from the 10th Party Congress in Moscow. [119] Bolshevik artillery on the shore of Gulf of Finland and damage to the Petropavlovsk during the assault

COLLECTION:All Lots must be collected witin three days of the auction, or delivery arrangements confirmed. Convinced of the popularity of the reforms they were fighting for (which they partially tried to implement during the revolt), the Kronstadt seamen waited in vain for the support of the population in the rest of the country and rejected aid from the emigres. Although the council of officers advocated a more offensive strategy, the rebels maintained a passive attitude as they waited for the government to take the first step in negotiations. By contrast, the authorities took an uncompromising stance, presenting an ultimatum demanding unconditional surrender on March 5. Once this period expired, the Bolsheviks raided the island several times and suppressed the revolt on March 18 after shooting and imprisoning several thousand rebels. The Kronstadt rebellion ( Russian: Кронштадтское восстание, romanized: Kronshtadtskoye vosstaniye) was a 1921 insurrection of Soviet sailors, naval infantry, [1] and civilians against the Bolshevik government in the Russian port city of Kronstadt. Located on Kotlin Island in the Gulf of Finland, Kronstadt defended the former capital city, Petrograd (now Saint Petersburg), as the base of the Baltic Fleet. For sixteen days in March 1921, rebels in Kronstadt's naval fortress rose in opposition to the Soviet government they had helped to consolidate. Led by Stepan Petrichenko, it was the last major revolt against Bolshevik rule on Russian territory during the Russian Civil War. [2] The Truth about Kronstadt: A Translation and Discussion of the Authors". www-personal.umich.edu. Archived from the original on 10 January 2017 . Retrieved 6 May 2018. Zinoviev, chair of the Petrograd council, and Trotsky, chair of the Revolutionary War Council, became enemies of Kronstadt after dropping an accusative leaflet over the city

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Avrich, Paul (1970). Kronstadt, 1921. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-08721-0. OCLC 67322. Private treaty sales made under these Conditions are deemed to be sales by auction for purposes of consumer legislation. Mawdsley, Evan (1978). The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet: War and Politics, February 1917–April 1918. Studies in Russian and East European History. Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-349-03761-2. Rogovin, Vadim Zakharovich (2009). Stalin's Terror of 1937-1938: Political Genocide in the USSR. Mehring Books. p.361. ISBN 978-1-893638-04-4.

Condition Reports are available for this sale.The absence of any condition or condition report does not mean, or imply, that the lot is free from any damage or restoration. Vernon Fox Trading trading as VF Auctions, its staff and agents, provide merely a subjective, qualified opinion and is only provided on this basis. ALL LOTS ARE OFFERED AND SOLD “AS IS” IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF BUSINESS. Soviet Russia in 1921 was not the Leviathan of recent decades. It was a young and insecure state, faced with a rebellious population at home and implacable enemies abroad who longed to see the Bolsheviks ousted from power. More important still, Kronstadt was in Russian territory; what confronted the Bolsheviks was a mutiny in their own navy at its most strategic outpost, guarding the western approaches to Petrograd. Kronstadt, they feared, might ignite the Russian mainland or become the springboard for another anti-Soviet invasion. There was mounting evidence that Russian emigres were trying to assist the insurrection and to turn it to their own advantage. Not that the activities of the Whites can excuse any atrocities which the Bolsheviks committed against the sailors. But they do make the government's sense of urgency to crush the revolt more understandable. In a few weeks the ice in the Finnish Gulf would melt, and supplies and reinforcements could then be shipped in from the West, converting the fortress into a base for a new intervention. Apart from the propaganda involved, Lenin and Trotsky appear to have been genuinely anxious over this possibility. [222] The various groups of emigres and government opponents were too divided to make a joint-effort for the rebels. [123] Kadetes, Mensheviks, and revolutionary socialists maintained their differences and did not collaborate to support the rebellion. [124] Victor Chernov and the revolutionary socialists attempted to launch a fundraising campaign to help the sailors, [125] but the PRC refused aid, [126] convinced that the revolt would spread throughout the country, with no need for foreign aid. [127] The Mensheviks, for their part, were sympathetic to the rebel demands but not to the revolt itself. [128] The Paris-based Russian Union of Industry and Commerce secured support from the French Foreign Ministry to supply the island and begin fundraising for the rebels. [129] Wrangel, whom the French continued to supply, promised his Constantinople troops to Kozlovsky and began an unsuccessful campaign to gain the support of the powers. [130] No power agreed to provide military support to the rebels, and only France tried to facilitate the arrival of food on the island. [131] Aid from the Finnish "kadetes" did not arrive in time. Even as anti-Bolsheviks called on the Russian Red Cross's assistance, no help came to the island during the two-week rebellion. [124] In the few mainland places supporting the rebels, the Bolsheviks promptly suppressed revolt. In the capital, a delegation from the naval base was arrested trying to convince an icebreaker's crew to join the rebellion. Most island delegates sent to the continent were arrested. Unable to spread the revolt and rejecting Soviet authorities demands to end the rebellion, the rebels adopted a defensive strategy of administrative reforms on the island and waiting for the spring thaw, which would increase their natural defenses against being detained. [160]Kronstadt 1921 Bolshevism vs. Counterrevolution", Spartacist, English edition No. 59, 2006 (International Communist League (Fourth Internationalist)) The Kronstadt sailors had been in the vanguard of the revolutionary events of 1905 and 1917. In 1917, Trotsky called them the "pride and glory of the Russian Revolution." The inhabitants of Kronstadt had been early supporters and practitioners of soviet power, forming a free commune in 1917 which was relatively independent of the authorities. In the words of Israel Getzler, an expert on Kronstadt: To call a nonpartisan Conference of the workers, Red Army soldiers and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and of Petrograd Province, no later than March 10, 1921;